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THE SANKHYA OR YOGA  APHORISMS OP PATANJALI.

INTRODUCTION.

a. Salutation to Ganesa! May that union of the twin-persons of Shiva and his spouse,—by the recollection of which one enjoys emancipation, hard as it is to attain,—produce for you all blessings!
b. From such passages of the scripture as this—viz.—NACHIKETA having received this science [viz. the Vedinta] declared to him by Yama, and all the rules of the yoga, and having arrived at the Supreme Soul, became passionless and immortal :—whosoever else also thus knows the Supreme Spirit, —it is inferred that the rules of the yoga ought to be understood and practised by those who are desirous of emancipation. Therefore, the vernerable PATANJALI, being about to exhibit the rules of the yoga, in order to gain the attention of his disciples, states as follows the doctrines of that science.

THE  YOGA  APHORISMS.

Subject Aph. 1.—Now, then, the exposition of yoga or Concentration [is to be made].

а. The expression * Now, then/ intimates [that] a [distinct] topic [here commences]; and it serves as a benediction* [—the particle atha being regarded an auspicious one].
б. The word yoga, from the root yuj ' to keep the mind fixed in abstract meditation,' means such a restraining of the exercise of the mind, or Concentration.
с An * exposition' is that whereby something is expounded, or declared, through its characteristic marks, its nature, &c. An ' exposition of the yoga,'—[such is the meaning of the com¬pound word yogdnuedehana.] This [—viz, the expounding of the nature, &c, of Concentration—] is to be understood to be the topic even to the end of this Institute^ [of PATANJALI'S].
d. But what is Concentration (yoga) ? To this he replies : —

Concentration Aph 2.—Concentration   (yoga) is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle.

a. That is to say,—Concentration is the hindering, or the preventing, of the modifications—to be described hereafter [see § 5] —of the Mind or internal organ [—to which modifica¬tions the internal organ is liable when allowed to come into contact with objects, as will be explained further on—]; and this ' hindering' is a super-sensual species of effort which is the cause of the destruction of these modifications.
3. But then [a doubt may here occur]. It is a tenet [—see Nyaya Aphorisms No. 31—] both of the Sdnkkya and the Yoga that the soul just consists of the knowledge which has as its objects the modifications [in question—the two being united] like fire and the wood [or fuel of the fire]:—on the destruction of the modifications, then, the Soul too should be annihilated,. as the fire is in the absence of the fuel :—and therefore, at the time of Concentration, what is the soul concerned about ? With* reference to this he declares as follws:*—

Condition of the soul during concentration Aph. 3.—Then   [i. e. at the time of Concentration j it [the Soul] abides in the form of the spectator [without a spectacle.]
a.' Then';—i. e. at that time.
b. 'In the form of the spectator;'—i. e. of soul [—see Tattwa-sanuisa §31—], in the form of Thought simply [without any object thought of]. ' Its state is' :—such is the force of the term avaethdnamt [rendered ' it abides/ &c]
с. And so the definition [of Concentration] is this, that concentration is thejundering of the modifications of the internal organ [prevention of its being modified] is the cause of the abigpg in the form of soul simply.
d. Whamhen is the form of this [Soul] when in a state other than that Concentration? To this he replies:—

Condition of the internal organ Aph. 4—At other times [than that of eonl at other tiiinee. Concentration] it [the soul] is in the same form as the modifications. 
a. 'At other times;'—i. e. at another time than that of 'Concentration. The ' modifications' are those that are to be described [see § 5]. To be ' in the same form' as these—means to consist of these. The meaning [of the whole] is that when the internal organ [or Mind], through the senses, is affected [or modified] by the form of some object, the soul also [viewing the object through its organ the Mind] is as it were altered into that form, as the moon [reflected] in the moving ripples of the water, looks as if that orb itself were moving*.
b. Well, then:—it was stated that the modifications [of the internal organ] are to be hindered. Of how many kinds, then, are these [modifications], or what are they like ? To this he replies:—

The modifications Aph. 5.—The  Modifications [of the  in... what like are either] painful or not painful.
a, * Modifications';—i. e. various altered states of the internal organ, « Of five kinds,' or of five sorts. ^Painful';—i. e. invadedby vexations which will be defined in the" sequel. ' Not .painful';—«L e. the reverse thereof.? ^V
b. Which are those five Modifications ? With ip%ence to this, he states:—

These Modifications specified - Aph.  6.—[The  modifications of the in ... misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory.
a. [All this is] clear.*
b. He defines these [modifications] in their order.

Right notions. Aph  7—The evidences  [§6J  are Perception, Inference, and Testimony.
a. Here [—it will be observed—] without stating the definition of the several kinds of evidence, this being so familiarly known, he has only divided them. [Lest, however, the reader should require the information, we may remark, in passing, that] the evidence called Perception is that modification of the internal organ which takes the form of assurance in respect of some object not previously apprehended. Inference is the modification of the internal organ produced from a correct notion of a general proposition, &c. [—respecting objects previously apprehended—as explained in the works of the Nyaya]. And the evidence called Testimony is [what produces] that modification of the internal organ which arises from the words of one worthy^ [to be received as an authority].
b. Having thus spoken of the modification of the internal organ which oonsists in evidence [—or, as we should rather say—which oonsists in the correct state of cognition resulting from good evidence—], he mentions that which is in the shape of misconception.§

Misconception Aph 8—Misconception is a wrong notion, not staying in the  [proper] form of that [in respect "whereof the misconception is entertained].
a. [That is to say—] misconception is a notion arising, in respect of something that is not so and so, that it is so and so; as, in the case of mother o'pearl, the notion of silver. 'Not staying in the [proper] form of that';—that is to say, which does not abide in that form which is the form of that thing [in respect of which the notion is entertained],—which amounts to its not revealing the form [or real nature] which belongs to the thing*
b. [To illustrate this language of our author, we may here state the theory of Understanding which he adopts, as we find it laid down in the Veddnta ParibMsM. The internal organ is there compared to water, in respect of its readiness to adapt itself to the form of whatever mould it may enter. " As the water of a reservoir, having issued from an aperture, having ntered, by a channel, the basins [or beds with raised edges formed in the fields that require irrigation—] becomes four-cornered or otherwise shaped just like them; so the manifesting internal organ [or Mind,] having gone, through the sight or other channel, to where there is an object, for instance a jar, beoomes modified by the form of the jar or other object.
It is this altered state [of the internal organ] that is called its modification."+ This 'manifesting internal organ/ whilst it is regarded as moulding itself upon the object, is regarded as at the same time manifesting it—or revealing it as a mirror does. To a considerable extent this theory of the Understanding is analogous to the theory of vision entertained by those wharegard the retina as reflecting to the intelligent principle those visible forms of which the retina itself is uncognisant; whilst the intelligent principle itself is cognisant of things visible only inasmuch as they are reflected to it by the retina. ['The modi¬fications' are akin to Locke's 'ideas']
с. Doubt also—for example whether the objeot be a man or a post—is a wrong notion [§8], inasmuch as the real nature of the object is not thereby revealed.*
d. In order to declare what modification [of the internal organ] is fancy—he says as follows:—

Fanciful notions Aph. 9.—A fancy is [a notion] devoid of defined. a thing [in reality corresponding thereto], following upon knowledge [conveyed] by words.
a. 'Knowldge produced [or conveyed] by words :'— [such is the sense of the compound] 'sdbda-dnydn^ the habit whereof is to follow this [verbal information],' and that is what is so named [viz. fancy]. The meaning is— that a fancy is a conception, without a thingj [corresponding to it].
b. Examples of this are stioh notions as ' The head of Mdhu,' and ' The soul's Thinking/—and ' Something like the horns of a hare,' &o. Even after [discovering] the absurdity [involved in such notions], people yet deal with verbal  knowledge [as if it were striotly receivable] in such senses, [—and it depends upon circumstances whether any serious error would result from this or not.]§
с [As a hare has no horn, the notion of a hare's horn is a fanciful one, * devoid of a thing in rerum natura corresponding *ц: to the notion/ A person hearing the expression 'The head of Rdhu' naturally proceeds to fancy that there is a Rdhu to whom this head belongs;—but Rdhu is all head—being a bodi¬less monster who is held to cause eclipses by swallowing the sun and the moon, which emerge from obscuration when they oome to the end of his dissevered gullet. The notion, therefore, raised by the expression * The head of Rdhu/ that there is any more of him besides the head, is a fancy—equally with that of the hare's horn—* devoid of a thing corresponding to the notion/ So again, a person hearing the expression * The soul's Think¬ing/ naturally proceeds to fancy that there is some Soul to whom this Thinking belongs,—whereas the Soul is nothing besides the Thinking. Although, according to the commenta¬tor, suoh expressions are liable to suggest fancies that have no¬thing in reality corresponding to them, yet the employment of the expressions does not necessarily mislead, if we carefully bear in mind what is the real state of the case. Much on the same principle people in Europe continue to speak of the sun's rising and setting, though, holding the heliocentrio theory, they do not really fancy that the sun either rises or sets]. d. In order to declare what is sleep, he says*—